The US received repeated warnings from Israel over the past year that Iran intended to target President Donald Trump, including some specific plans that US intelligence agencies were unable to verify independently, according to current and former US officials reported by Reuters.
Warnings, uncertainty and precautionary measures
Officials said the warnings began in the run-up to the 12‑day war in June 2025 and escalated before the US decision to go to war in Iran in February. The most detailed intelligence reportedly arrived ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara in July, when Israeli briefers told the White House that Iran might attempt to strike Mr Trump — potentially with a shoulder‑launched missile while he was aboard Air Force One.
US agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), were reported not to have independent evidence to corroborate some of the specific plots conveyed by Israeli counterparts. Turkish intelligence likewise did not find evidence to confirm the asserted threat in the NATO episode, a Turkish official told US authorities.
Despite the lack of confirmation, the White House and the Secret Service adopted precautionary steps. One such measure was a deception operation in Turkey: Mr Trump was reportedly moved from Air Force One to another aircraft as part of an effort to mitigate perceived risk.
What was reported to have been alleged
According to the reporting, the warnings encompassed varied scenarios, including:
- plans to shoot Mr Trump with a sniper;
- recruitment of an assailant to attack with a knife at a public event;
- use of a shoulder‑launched missile against Air Force One while in flight.
US officials characterised the tips as coming from Israeli intelligence and sometimes relayed directly by Israeli officials to senior White House figures. The US intelligence community has long assessed that Iran harbours motives for retaliation linked to Washington's earlier killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020; however, that broader intent is distinct from the specific allegations that US agencies could not corroborate.
Consequences and diplomatic implications
The episode highlights how allied intelligence can shape executive decision‑making even when the information is contested. It also underlines the operational posture that protective services will adopt when faced with potentially credible but unverified threats.
For allied capitals and host nations, the material reportedly shared by Israeli sources prompted both action and scepticism. In the Ankara incident, Turkish agencies assessed they lacked evidence to back Israel's claim — a conclusion that influenced the US response.
| Date/Period | Reported development | Reported US response |
|---|---|---|
| Lead‑up to June 2025 | Initial warnings from Israel about potential threats | Heightened awareness among US agencies |
| June 2025 | 12‑day war period; warnings intensify | Continued monitoring |
| July (NATO summit) | Detailed warning of possible missile threat to Air Force One | Deception operation in Turkey; aircraft change |
| February | Warnings reportedly intensified before US decision to go to war in Iran | Ongoing security precautions |
The account, based on current and former US officials speaking to Reuters, does not establish that an Iranian plot was in hand. It does, however, show how allied intelligence exchanges can prompt tactical measures by protective services even when central elements of the reporting remain unverified.
That dynamic is important for policymakers to consider: acting on uncorroborated intelligence can be prudent from a security standpoint, but it carries diplomatic consequences and risks prompting escalatory responses. It also places a premium on rigorous inter‑agency analysis and transparent communication among allies.
For the public, the episode is a reminder that national security decisions often rest on uncertain information and on judgements about acceptable risk. The US response in Turkey demonstrates how authorities may prefer visible precaution to the possibility of catastrophic inaction.
