The attacks of 11 September 2001 were not only a moment of violence; they were a turning point in the politics of Western democracies, according to a wide‑ranging analysis in Time. The essay contends that the American response — the so‑called “war on terror” — set in motion a long retreat from some liberal principles and allowed older conflicts over empire, decolonisation, immigration and culture to resurface, particularly in far‑right movements.
From asymmetric warfare to political realignment
The piece argues that the instantaneous framing of the attacks as inaugurating an era of asymmetric violence led to a political consensus in which security imperatives dominated public life. President George W. Bush’s characterisation of the struggle as a generational conflict helped normalise extraordinary measures and long‑running military interventions. Yet the author suggests that the threat posed by Al‑Qaeda and related Islamist militancy receded far sooner than the global politics it had provoked.
Key to the essay’s argument is this claim: Islamic militancy largely declined not because of decisive battlefield victories but because it failed to secure broad popular support in the Muslim world. When mass uprisings swept parts of the Middle East in the early 2010s, protesters invoked democratic aspirations rather than Islamist project. The Arab Spring is presented as the decisive popular rejection of militant agendas — “Al Qaeda faced its greatest defeat at Tahrir Square,” the author writes.
“Al Qaeda faced its greatest defeat at Tahrir Square.”
What really ended with 9/11?
The essay goes further, proposing that the post‑9/11 era marked the true end of the Cold War order. While the Soviet collapse had already removed the bipolar structure that dominated the 20th century, the institutions created during the Cold War — NATO, the United Nations and a raft of multilateral agencies — had continued to operate. The shock of 9/11, the argument runs, exposed the fragility of that institutional continuity and encouraged unilateral or securitised approaches to international problems.
Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the growth of insurgent and criminal violence in those theatres, are cited as examples of how the “war on terror” produced its own destructive dynamics. The emergence of the Islamic State is used to illustrate how detention, conflict and the breakdown of state control in those wars incubated new extremist formations rather than extinguishing the phenomenon.
- Security prioritised over liberalism: National security framed policy and public discourse across Western democracies.
- Militancy’s limited social base: Islamist militancy failed to gain the mass legitimacy needed to sustain a transnational political project.
- Institutional strain: Cold War‑era multilateral structures continued but their authority and coherence were weakened.
The essay is not a simple vindication of counter‑terror policy: it highlights an irony. Militancy peaked in environments created by the wars meant to crush it. At the same time, the popular politics of the Arab Spring suggested different fault lines — calls for accountable government, economic reform and civil liberties — that the securitised Western response largely ignored.
For South African readers, the analysis offers a reminder of how external shocks can recalibrate domestic politics. When states prioritise security responses, civil liberties and multilateral co‑operation can be sidelined. The long shadow of 9/11, then, is not only the conflicts it produced but the political settlements and choices that followed: who benefits from enhanced security architectures, and who bears the costs in terms of rights, resources and international legitimacy.
Whether the erosion of liberal norms identified in the essay proves permanent remains an open question. The author’s case is that the violent episode of 9/11 catalysed a broader realignment in political life — one that revived older disputes over empire and identity even as the specific militant threat diminished.
