Turkey has grown into one of Russia’s most important trading partners since the Kremlin launched its full‑scale invasion of Ukraine, expanding commercial links rapidly in 2022 and sustaining high volumes of exchanges thereafter. The relationship, however, is pragmatic rather than strategic: Ankara balances economic opportunity with periodic alignment to Western positions, analysts reported.
Trade surge and its composition
Turning to the numbers, bilateral turnover between the two countries rose sharply from $33 billion in 2021 to $68 billion in 2022, a jump that reflected Russia’s urgency to find markets and partners after Western sanctions narrowed its traditional economic outlets.
The composition of Russian exports to Turkey differs from Moscow’s shipments elsewhere in the region. Around 70% of deliveries to Turkey are energy and petroleum products — oil, gas, coal and refined products — used by Turkey both for domestic consumption and for onward sale into third markets. Agri‑food, metals and industrial commodities account for most of the remainder.
- Energy and petroleum products: roughly 70% of Russian exports to Turkey.
- Agri‑food: about $3.8 billion in 2025, roughly 9% of Russian exports to Turkey.
- Steel and pig iron: $3.4 billion.
- Copper: $1.28 billion; aluminium: $1.06 billion.
Investment, projects and secondary trade routes
Investment has reinforced the commercial link: the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast by Russia’s Rosatom is a flagship project, with an estimated value of $20−25 billion. Russian inflows into the Turkish economy since 2022 are put at $4−6 billion, and Russian nationals have consistently been among the top foreign buyers on Turkey’s property market.
Analysts have also highlighted a notable dynamic: Turkey acts as both a final destination and a transhipment point. In particular, Russian petroleum products have reached European markets via Turkey, complicating Western efforts to isolate Russian energy exports.
Pragmatism, limits and geopolitical balance
Despite growing commercial depth, the relationship has not matured into a formal strategic alliance. Ankara’s approach is described as measured: it pursues substantial imports and investment from Russia on pragmatic grounds while retaining the capacity to check that course against Western concerns and broader international pressures. That balancing act leaves the partnership resilient but conditional.
| Item | Value (USD) |
|---|---|
| Bilateral turnover (2021) | $33 billion |
| Bilateral turnover (2022) | $68 billion |
| Agrifood exports (2025) | $3.8 billion |
| Steel & pig iron | $3.4 billion |
| Copper | $1.28 billion |
| Aluminium | $1.06 billion |
| Rosatom — Akkuyu project | $20–25 billion |
The effect for Moscow has been tangible: Turkey now ranks among Russia’s top three trading partners, behind China and in competition with India for second place. For Ankara, the economic relationship supplies energy inputs, industrial materials and investment, as well as a steady flow of tourists and property buyers.
“Expanding economic cooperation with Turkey became one of the main answers” to Russia’s post‑2022 isolation, analysts reported.
What this means for the wider world
For states watching the sanctions landscape and energy markets, the Turkey–Russia dynamic is a reminder that economic interdiction can drive commerce into alternative channels rather than halt it altogether. Where trade volumes are large and commodities fungible, third‑party markets and transit hubs can dilute the intended impact of restrictions.
That reality complicates policy choices for Western capitals and for countries such as South Africa that monitor shifts in global supply chains and geopolitical alignments. Ankara’s model — pursuing intensive economic ties while maintaining tactical independence on diplomacy — offers both an opportunity and a headache for partners seeking predictable behaviour in an era of contested norms.
The relationship between Moscow and Ankara remains a study in practical horse‑trading: mutually useful commerce without a full political embrace, and a reminder that economic ties often move faster than strategic trust.
